Bullshit and the Metaphor of Speaking One's Mind by Eubanks, Philip
 2 
Bullshit and the Metaphor of Speaking One’s Mind 
 
 
 
Previous: Letter from the Editors by Thom Bryce, 
Melissa Dalgleish, Nemanja Protic 
Next: Legible Liars: Thackeray’s Barry Lyndon as 
Professor of Imposture by Elizabeth Bleicher 
 
 
 
Bullshit and the Metaphor of 
Speaking One’s Mind 
Keynote Address 
Philip Eubanks 
Pivot is published through Open Journal Systems (OJS) at York 
University 
 
 
  
Bullshit and the Metaphor 
of Speaking One’s Mind 
Keynote Address 
Philip Eubanks 
 
  
  
In 2009, my colleague John Schaeffer and I published an 
article in College Composition and Communication entitled “A 
Kind Word for Bullshit: The Problem of Academic Writing.” I 
want to begin by mentioning how we came to write the piece. 
It’s an interesting story, I think. We were originally inspired 
to write the article in 2005 when the philosopher Harry 
Frankfurt’s classic 
essay “On Bullshit” was 
re-issued as a stand-
alone book. When the 
book came out, there 
was plenty of hoopla. 
Frankfurt even did a 
guest shot on The Daily 
Show. Schaeffer and I 
were eager to read the essay—we hadn’t been familiar with it 
before. Of course, neither of us had any idea that we would 
eventually write anything about it. It seemed rather far afield 
from our usual interests. 
But a funny thing happened. Shortly after I read the essay, I 
had a dream—an extraordinarily vivid dream in which 
Friedrich Nietzsche played an important part. Nietzsche burst 
in on me in my university office, where I was working in the 
wee hours of the morning. As it happened, he had just read 
Frankfurt’s “On Bullshit” and was very taken by it. In fact, he 
seemed to be nearly in a manic state of excitement. His hair 
looked untamed, his moustache more than usually 
overgrown. He jabbed his hands in the air. He raved about 
the “clever beasts who invented knowing” and said to me—in 
English, by the way: “Don’t you see? It’s all bullshit. It’s 
always been bullshit.” This dream was strange enough. But, 
as it turned out, John Schaeffer—only a few nights before—
had had a very similar dream that featured not Nietzsche but 
Jacques Derrida. 
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Perhaps I should stop there. None of this is true, as much as 
I wish it were. Nietzsche never appeared to me in a dream. I 
have no idea what John Schaeffer dreams about, but I hope 
it’s not Derrida. I have broken my vow (to myself) that I 
would not bullshit you. 
To continue more straightforwardly: It was only once 
Schaeffer and I read Frankfurt’s essay that we recognized 
that it hit upon a key problem in the study of writing that, to 
us, has never seemed fully resolved: the question of a 
writer’s self-representation. We were familiar, of course, with 
arguments about the “self.” Many challenge the idea of an 
authentic core that awaits expression, once the writer—and 
not least the student writer—digs deeply enough inside of 
him- or herself. Numerous writing specialists—and, of course, 
not just writing specialists—have pointed out that the self is 
not a fixed entity, that it does not occupy a hidden waiting 
room within our minds or hearts or gut, and that it is only 
reified, not real, when we claim to express ourselves. In 
short, the self is a fluid construction that is an amalgam of 
innumerable influences. 
What that has to do with bullshit is simply this. Frankfurt 
argues rather convincingly that bullshit is not mere lying but 
is, instead, and perhaps fundamentally so, a 
misrepresentation of self. So the question has to be asked: If 
the self is a fluid construction, influenced by a thousand 
things large and small—if there really is no self—how is it 
possible to misrepresent it? 
But let me pause here to confess that my resolve is weak. I 
have bullshitted you again. The first time I did it, you 
probably caught on rather quickly. I told you that Nietzsche 
came raving to me in a dream. That was bullshit—pure and 
simple. 
The second time I bullshitted you was when I claimed, at 
some length, that Schaeffer and I became interested in 
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bullshit because we realized that it was related to scholarly 
critiques of the self. In that instance, you may or may not 
have detected the aroma of male bovine fecal matter. But if 
you didn’t, don’t feel too badly. Your bullshit detector is 
probably in good working order. 
For one thing, what I said was at least partly true. Our 
interest in writing about bullshit was piqued when we realized 
that questions of bullshit and the self were related. The 
problem is, that realization did not occur in one fell swoop as 
I made it seem. It developed in fits and starts, over the 
course of numerous conversations that, frankly, I can no 
longer remember. And it only came into sharp focus once we 
had started writing the essay. Surely, our thought process 
was recursive, non-linear, perhaps disjointed, and partly 
unconscious. 
So while my account may be as true these kinds of accounts 
tend to be—the implicit claim that I could provide a succinct 
explanation of our thought process was really false. My 
account was false also because I claimed to tell you about 
two people’s thought processes, even though I couldn’t even 
tell you my own. And even if something I said was roughly 
true, that was only an accident. I falsely represented to you 
that I remembered the truth of the matter. So I uttered quite 
a few falsehoods in a fairly short time. But none were the 
kind that would make a bullshitter proud. 
I did bullshit you, but it wasn’t the kind of bullshit done for 
the sake of factual deception. Rather it was the kind of 
bullshit that is meant to misrepresent the self (whatever that 
may be). It was designed to construct an image of me as a 
rational scholar. Moreover, it played into a larger notion of 
academic study as a rational and disinterested enterprise. My 
change of diction was part and parcel of that, of course. I 
began this piece with language like “working in the wee hours 
of the morning,” but then turned academic on you with 
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phrases like “a fluid construction that is an amalgam of 
innumerable influences.” In sum, I tried to favorably 
construct my ethos in a way that would help you to favorably 
construct your own. And to the extent that we are kidding 
each other, it’s really just bullshit. 
So, then, why have I begun by bullshitting you not once but 
twice? I’ve done it in order to contrast what Schaeffer and I 
have called prototypical bullshit from a more acceptable 
variety of non-prototypical bullshit that, we think, 
characterizes most academic writing. That is the basis of our 
addendum—or challenge—vis-à-vis Harry Frankfurt. Frankfurt 
reasons well that bullshit can be a matter not of lying but 
merely of misrepresentation of the self. At the same time, 
though, he uses what Coleman and Kay—famous for their 
analysis of the word to lie—call the “checklist method” of 
definition. He identifies qualities that bullshit may have and 
tries to define it by its necessary qualities. 
But that is somewhat misguided, I would insist. By 
emphasizing what might possibly be considered bullshit, 
Frankfurt ends up defining it by odd rather than ordinary 
instances. I agree with Coleman and Kay—and many other 
cognitive linguists—that words name categories and that 
categories are graded. There are central instances—the 
prototypical ones—and peripheral instances. This view can be 
traced back to Eleanor Rosch’s experiments in which, for 
example, robin was listed more often and identified more 
quickly as a bird than, say, emu. An emu is just as much a 
bird as a robin is. But it’s not the first bird that comes to 
mind. Likewise, non-lying bullshit is just as much bullshit as 
lying bullshit. But it’s not the central case. 
We noted in our essay that we—academic writers, that is—
take great care to write things that are mostly accurate, but 
we also craft our writing in a way that constructs a credible 
public representation of self: an acceptable professional 
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ethos. That sort of non-prototypical bullshit is not necessarily 
a bad thing, we said. If it is false in ways, it also reminds us 
of what we should aspire to be. It is a version of “fake it till 
you make it.” Virtually all academic writers do it, and within 
certain ethical limits we ought to tolerate it when our 
students do the same thing. 
I want to raise a different question here, however. A riskier 
question, I think. What if we were too timid? What if bullshit 
can lead us to something better than just “our better selves”? 
At least where our advanced students are concerned, 
shouldn’t we ask them to aspire not to almost undetectable 
non-prototypical bullshit but perhaps to prototypical bullshit—
the kind I tried my hand at in very beginning of this talk, 
though perhaps not so clumsy and obvious. 
Here’s what I mean. Academic bullshit, Schaeffer and I have 
claimed, is not “characterized by outrageousness but rather 
by earnestness (indeed, by earnest tedium).” We academics 
often write essays and books that live up to very particular 
standards of academic diligence and truthfulness and are, 
therefore, both earnest and tedious. And we feel little 
reticence about teaching our students to write the same 
way—to have them pretend to be like us. Sometime back, in 
his essay “Inventing the University,” David Bartholomae put it 
this way, to quote him a bit elliptically: A student has to write 
“as though he were a member of the academy . . . mimicking 
its language. . . . He must learn to speak our language. Or he 
must dare to speak it or to carry off the bluff.” Carry off the 
bluff? What can that mean except to bullshit us by pretending 
to be like us? Exacting. And maybe a little dull. 
Yet it seems to me that there is a disconnect in this that 
needs to be reconnected. True, academic writing serves an 
important purpose. But knowing how to write academically 
isn’t the same thing as knowing how to write. When I teach 
so-called “advanced composition,” I am less concerned with 
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academic standards than with good writing in the form it 
takes outside of the walls of the university. In other words, 
I’m concerned not with writing that people need to read but 
with writing people want to read. 
A lot of us, a lot of the time, like to read prototypical bullshit. 
By which I mean: writing that significantly misrepresents the 
self, that engages in rhetorical gamesmanship, and that 
sounds—and perhaps is—incredible. I’m not referring to the 
mother of all bullshit: fiction. I’m referring to workaday, 
published non-fiction. One function of bullshit in much good 
writing is to gain and hold a reader’s attention. It can also 
lead readers to valuable ideas, even if the method is not 
entirely on the up-and-up. 
Along these lines, I have selected readings for my advanced 
composition students that involve a certain amount of writerly 
bullshit. Not “Letter from the Birmingham Jail.” Not “Politics 
and the English Language.” Certainly not Emerson or Susan 
Sontag or E.B. White or Joan Didion or—you complete the list. 
Why not these, the greatest of essayists, you may wonder? 
Because: The greatest fault of student writing is its dullness. 
The great writers may well be interesting, but they are also 
subtle and serious. And they have their ways. Students, I 
want to suggest, need an overdrawn example, where the 
rhetorical strategies are more obvious and, frankly, more 
appealing. 
So I’ve been looking for readings that satisfy two criteria. 
First, I think students will want to read them. Second, I want 
to read them—and I mean read them when I’m not being 
good. 
Let me mention an example and do some bullshit analysis on 
it. 
There is a U.S. news publication called The Week. It features 
a weekly essay in the back, which is usually carved out from 
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an article or a book published elsewhere. I have assigned a 
few of these essays because, it seemed to me, they are 
meant to be a treat at the end of the magazine. They not only 
attract readers; they attract happy readers. And the essays 
are pretty smart, too. This one appealed to me, and it 
appealed to my students also: “Why Books Are Overrated” by 
Mikita Brottman. The essay is stitched together, using 
excerpts from her book The Solitary Vice. 
Listen to that essay’s title (crafted by The Week, not by 
Brottman, no doubt, but not unfairly). “Why Books Are 
Overrated.” What bullshit. And what a wonderful quality of 
bullshit the title promises. It doesn’t sound quite like a lie. A 
lie is meant to deceive, undetected. But bullshit can walk the 
line between concealment and display—as if the speech act 
were: “I dare you not to believe this.” Before reading the first 
word of “Why Books Are Overrated,” you probably have the 
feeling that Brottman doesn’t really and truly believe what 
she’s about to tell you. 
In fact, I think I can demonstrate that she doesn’t believe it 
at all. She is a psychoanalyst who teaches on the college 
level. In her spare time, she reviews books. Here’s a short 
selection from one of her blog posts: 
 Since I occasionally review books for various 
websites, I was recently given the opportunity to list 
my top ten books of 2007. After a little thought, 
however, I had to decline. Not because I didn't read 
any books in 2007 — on the contrary, I read far too 
many, as usual. 
 If, like me, you're a regular book buyer, looking back 
at your Amazon.com order history is like looking at a 
record of your year (try it and see). There are all the 
year's urges and impulses, laid out before you in black 
and white. 
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 There are certain titles…that remind me vividly of the 
summer — books that I carried around in my 
backpack along with sun tan oil and mosquito spray, 
like A Bark in the Park - 50 Best Places to Hike with 
your Dog in Baltimore. I read Daniel Menaker's The 
Treatment, floating in an inner tube in a cool pond; 
The Sisters - The Saga of the Mitford Family by Mary 
S. Lowell immediately brings to mind the sound of 
crickets and a swimming pool filter. 
I cannot read those passages and still believe Brottman when 
she warns us about the harm that books can do. She loves 
books. She loves nothing more than books. However, I do 
believe her when she writes, less extravagantly, in The Week 
that “books can take you to wonderful places, but they can 
leave you stranded there, isolated from other human beings, 
even from your own experience.” That is her point, after all—
that books, to some degree, can lure people away from social 
interaction and honest self-examination. 
But I forgive her for bullshitting me. The fact is, her 
bullshitting is a good rhetorical strategy. To begin with, her 
statement is pretty startling. Have you ever given the advice, 
“Begin with a startling statement”? I have. But did you add, 
“Lie if you have to”? If Brottman’s title is a lie, it is a useful 
one because it contradicts everything everybody who matters 
in the literate world believes about books. In the opening of 
her essay in The Week, she recites the full litany of pro-
reading catch phrases: “Get caught reading.” “Read and 
grow.” “Reading is fundamental.” To all of that Brottman 
says, in a word, Bullshit. Reading is dangerously intoxicating. 
It is isolating. As critics of reading from centuries past warned 
us, books are full of dangerous ideas. Brottman claims to be 
harmed herself by overly idealized depictions of love in the 
Victorian novels she once devoured—fancy notions that made 
all of her youthful experience with love doubly painful and 
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unsatisfying and drove her to withdraw from the world almost 
entirely. 
But is that really so? If not for books, would Brottman’s youth 
have been spent drinking in the world, up-close and personal? 
Would she have adjusted her expectations to the real world of 
love and sex? Or is she bullshitting us, just a little, when she 
writes, 
Reading Jane Eyre convinced me that, if it could happen 
to Jane, it could happen to me. [But] nobody ever asked 
for my hand in marriage. Nobody even called me on the 
phone. The more real life disappointed me, the more I 
buried myself in books; and the longer I spent reading, 
the more remote grew the possibility of actual escape. 
You may be thinking, “But wait, I was a bookworm who used 
escaped into literary fantasies! That was my life!” It’s one of 
the good things about good bullshit that it sounds sort of 
true. But let’s be boringly honest here. A lot of people have 
had a tough adolescence, and books may be one form of 
adolescent escape, but that’s not a good reason to warn 
people off of them. 
My co-author John Schaeffer was once asked on a radio 
program, “Who is the most important person of the past 
thousand years?” He said, “Gutenberg. Without him, nothing 
else could have happened.” Isn’t the plain, boring truth that 
books may have unintended side-effects, but that they are 
supremely important—and not over-rated at all? And isn’t it 
also true that putting it that way would make for a duller 
essay than the one Brottman wrote? 
Of course, not all bullshit succeeds—at least, not with my 
advanced composition students. I’ve twice assigned, for 
example, a chapter from Randall Robinson’s Quitting America. 
Robinson is famous for advocating that reparations be paid to 
the descendants of slaves. In Quitting America, a memoir 
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about moving to the Caribbean island St. Kitts, his views 
about race and about the United States are not understated. 
When I have assigned Robinson, I have braced myself for an 
uncomfortable conversation about race. But it hasn’t 
materialized. Instead, my students have complained that he 
is a bullshitter. That he tries to pass off as true things that 
just make no sense to them. 
To wit: Denouncing violence in America, he discusses a kid he 
once knew, Mordecai, who tortured animals—for example, 
killing a frog just for the fun of it: Writes Robinson, “If 
Mordecai had to “buy a license,” “buy a hunting rifle,” buy 
“more paraphernalia,” “pile into . . . a car at three or four in 
the morning,” and then “shiver in the woods . . . for hours” in 
order to kill the frog, he would have “foregone the pleasure” 
(9). That is to say, Who are the crazy ones? Psychopathic 
Mordecai? Or the members of the National Rifle Association—
known otherwise in the U.S. as the “gun lobby”? My students 
called him on this. Hunting may not be to everyone’s taste, 
but hunters are not, generally speaking, psychopaths. 
Of course, that’s just the kind of claim most of us teach our 
students not to make. A claim needs credible support, we 
say. True, the academic community—and writing studies in 
particular—has mostly moved beyond an unproblematized 
advocacy of thesis and support. But the way we have moved 
on has been to recognize that truth is complicated, that 
where you stand depends on where you sit. We have talked a 
lot about discourses and geographies. We don’t often 
advocate truth with a capital T. But we’re not averse to real 
with a capital R. 
We may not have talked enough about what it takes to write 
something that people will be drawn to. That is largely 
because we have some duty to teach academic writing. Yet 
that’s not all we teach. And when we teach other kinds of 
 15 
Pivot 1.1 
writing, I’m wondering if we would be more honest if we 
advocated a certain kind of lying: bullshit. 
I don’t mean benign, non-prototypical bullshit, either. I mean 
writing that might cause someone to say, “What bullshit!” 
Writing that adopts a pose. Writing that makes a claim that is 
stretched to the point of breaking. Writing in which evidence 
is selected, uh, selectively. 
If I’m right about that, then there is a second figure we need 
to deal with—at least one. That is the metaphor of voice—
and, in particular, the version that is associated with the core 
self or and speaking one’s mind. I suspect that more 
“writerly” the writing, the less concerned we need to be about 
authentic selves and authentic voices. I suspect we need to 
be concerned with the writer’s license to stray from the truth. 
To lie. Or, at least, to bullshit.  
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